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COPYRIGHT LAW-THE EXTENSION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
TO COMPUTER OPERATING PROGRAMS-Apple Computer v. Franklin 
Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. August 30, 1983) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last eight years the growing popularity of video game and 
personal computers has created a recognized need to protect the devel­
opers of the computer programs used in machines. Congress recog­
nized the problem by revising the Copyright Act in 19761 and 
appointing the National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (CONTU).2 In 1980, Congress adopted the rec­
ommendations of CONTU and amended the 1976 Copyright Act spe­
cifically to include computer programs.3 Notwithstanding the clear 
statement that computer programs were protected by copyright, ques­
tions arose as to the extent of the protection intended by Congress. 
The court in Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer" answered one 
question by holding that the copyright law protected5 fourteen com­
puter operating programs, developed for use in the Apple II personal 
computer and copied by Franklin for use in its ACE 100 personal 
computer.6 The court concluded that Congress intended to protect all 
computer programs: those that interacted with humans, or applica­
tion programs, and those that interacted only with machines, or oper­
ating programs. 7 
In order to understand the importance of Franklin both legally 
and commercially, this note will discuss briefly the way in which per­
sonal computers operate. Next, this note will examine the legislative 
and case law developments of copyright protection for computer pro­
grams from the advent of computers in the late 1940's to the decision 
1. 17 U.S.C. (1982); (Copyright Act of 1976). Congress originally enacted Title 17 in 
July, 1947, and revised it in its entirety by Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, effective January 
1, 1978. 
2. Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copy­
righted Works (July 31, 1978) (hereinafter CONTU REPORT). 
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 6460, 6482. 
4. 714 F.2d 1240 (1983). 
5. [d. at 1242-45. 
6. [d. at 1253. 
7. [d. at 1248-49. 
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in Franklin in September of 1983. Finally, this note will consider the 
decision in Franklin as following the implied intent of Congress to 
grant copyright protection to all computer programs. 
II. TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The technological development in the 1970's of using silicon 
chips to encode operating instructions for electronic devices initially 
lead to the widespread use of hand calculators and in the 1980's to the 
broad popularity of personal computers. Personal computers are pres­
ently widely used by small businesses for such things as inventory con­
trol or billing as well as for entertainment and educational instruction 
in the home. Growing computer use has created a growth market for 
software and peripheral modules, or hardware, which expands the use 
of the computer system. 8 The expanded popularity of computers is 
creating the demand for adaptable personal computers that perform a 
wide variety of functions. 9 Thus, the marketability of personal com­
puters clearly corresponds to their ability to adapt to available 
software and hardware packages. 
Programs in a computer's Central Processing Unit, or CPU, de­
termines its adaptability. The CPU contains a system of operating 
programslO that instructs the computer as to how and in what se­
quence certain operations will occur. I I In order for software or hard­
8. "Software" is a computer program that instructs the computer how to perform a 
specific function. such as balancing a checkbook or playing a video game. "Peripheral 
modules" are components that expand the functional tlexibility of the personal computer 
and includes such items as a "disk drive" for reading data stored magnetically on a "tloppy 
disk" and phone modules for connecting to commercial data bases or printers. "Floppy 
disks" are thin tlexible magnetic disks used to store computer programs and data base sets. 
which are not part of the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the computer but which inter­
act with the CPU. See infra note ll. and accompanying text. 
9. Families use personal computers for such diverse functions as typing a term paper, 
arranging a musical score. calculating the monthly mortgage payments for homes being 
sold. or performing a statistical analysis on the results of all the NFL football games played 
in a given week. 
10. Two general categories of computer programs exist: (1) The operating program 
which contains instructions for the internal operation of the machine and of which the user 
is normally unaware; and (2) application programs which generally interact with the user. 
allowing the user to provide or obtain information or select alternate paths of the program. 
See Apple Computer. Inc. v. Franklin Computer. 545 F. Supp. 812. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1982), 
rev'd. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
11. For example, the CPU instructs the computer how to: 

1) access outside information for temporary storage in its internal memory; 

2) structure the internal memory in various configurations to maximize memory 

capacity; 
3) communicate with the user on either a printer or a video cathode ray (VCR). 
which is essentially a T.V. screen. 
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ware components to be compatiblel2 with a particular computer, they 
must be able to interact with the computer's CPU.13 In theory, a com­
plex operating program such as exists in a CPU may be written in an 
almost infinite number of ways and result in a nearly identical func­
tional capacity.14 The theory is particularly true when no external 
limitations exist on any of the variables to be used. As more program­
ming parameters become limited by outside factors, IS however, the 
more limited become the number of alternate methods in which a pro­
gram can be written and still maintain wide adaptability.16 Only two 
choices remain to a manufacturer trying to enter the field of personal 
computers. 
New entrants into the personal computer field may choose to de­
velop and manufacture entirely innovative systems not compatible 
with any previously existing software or hardware packages. They 
would have both to develop and to manufacture a large number. of 
products l7 that would meet great consumer resistance if the compo­
nents were not compatible with equipment and application programslS 
already available. More likely, however, new entrants would want to 
capitalize on the already existing market and make their products as 
compatible as possible with software and hardware already available. 
The most efficient way to achieve compatibility with a large per­
centage of available software and hardware consists of copying some 
of the key operating programs from the CPU of a popular personal 
computer because, by definition, a wide range of support packages al­
ready exists for it. A more difficult as well as more expensive way·to 
achieve compatibility consists of developing a completely new operat­
ing system that precisely duplicates the functional aspects of a CPU 
from a popular personal computer. Franklin Computer faced pre­
cisely this choice when it decided to enter the personal computer mar­
12. "Compatible" means that the particular component can be used with a particular 
computer. 
13. The computer and the CPU must speak the same language in order to be com­
patible. Small differences in the dialect of the language may preclude the use of specific 
desirable software or hardware components. 
14. See Note. Copyright Protection ojComputer Program Object Code. 96 HARv. L. 
REV. 1723. 1736 (1983). 
15. Outside factors include particular application programs and peripheral compo­
nents already in existence and with which a new program must be compatible. 
16. Franklin essentially used this argument in its case. See Franklin. 714 F.2d at 
1245. 
17. For instance. the new manufacturer would have to develop and manufacture its 
own CPU. disk drive. and printer. as well as create its own version of the popular applica­
tion programs including video games. word processing, and graphics. 
18. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
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ket in 1981. 19 
III. 	 DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER 
PROGRAMS 
A. 1909 Copyright Act 
The first commercial computers were built shortly after World 
War II and were so large and expensive that only the federal govern­
ment and the largest corporations considered owning them. Programs 
created exclusively for the particular computer controlled the early 
computers.20 As the technology progressed, size and cost of operating 
. computers decreased to the point that homes and small businesses now 
widely use them.21 With the increased use of computers came the com­
mercial need to protect the computer programs that operated the 
machine. Since copyright protection gave the holder the exclusive 
right to reproduce, adapt, publish, perfonn or display the work,22 
software producers sought its protection.23 The copyright law of 
1909, however, extended protection only to "copies which were per­
ceptible to humans-things written or printed. . . in intelligible nota­
tion."24 The Copyright Act of 1909 codified the rule laid down by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in White-Smith Music Co. v. 
Apollo CO.,2S in which the Court held that a piano roll was not a copy 
of a musical composition since it would not be intelligibly perceived by 
a human observer.26 
The statutory language limited copyright protection to computer 
programs written in "high-level" or programmer language.27 Before a 
computer can use a computer program, however, it must be written in 
19. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. 812, 812-16 (E.D. 
Pa., 1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d err. 1983). 
20. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
21. Id. 
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1981). 
23. Chandler, Proprietary Protection of Computer Software, II U. BALT. L. REv. 
195, 214 (1982). 
24. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 779 
(C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting White-Smith Music Co. v. 
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908». 
25. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
26. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17. Only state law protected musical recordings until 
Congress passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. 
27. Programmer languages include BASIC for personal computers, COBOL for 
business computers, and FORTRAN for scientific computers. Languages employ English­
like words and syntax and are easily understood by one trained in the language. Note, 
Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1723, 1725 
(1983). 
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"machine" language or object code.28 Since copyright protection did 
not extend to the computer program in its useful form the value of the 
copyright protection was dubious. The Registry of Copyrights ex­
pressed these doubts when it decided to accept computer programs for 
registration in 1964.29 Tenuous protection continued until Congress 
modernized the copyright law in the 1976 Copyright Act. 
B. 1976 Copyright Act 
In 1976, Congress greatly expanded the scope of material that 
could be protected by copyright. Instead of limiting protection to 
written or printed copies intelligible to human beings, Congress ex­
tended protection to all "original works of authorship fixed in any tan­
gible medium of expression" that could be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated "either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device."30 Under section 102 of the Copyright Act, the inability of 
a human being to understand binary code readily did not prevent its 
copyright protection, provided that a copy of the work could have 
been perceived or reproduced with the aid of a machine or device. 
Thus, an application program or software generally perceivable with 
the assistance of a computer would have been subject to copyright pro­
tection.31 Congress, however, left unanswered the question whether 
the addition of section 117 to the 1976 Copyright Act would protect 
computer programs.32 Section 117 specifically preserved the existing 
28. In object code, also known as binary code, the programmer reduces all instruc­
tions of the program to clusters of "ones" and "zeros" which the machine can interpret as a 
gate that is either open or closed. While a patient individual trained in the field could 
theoretically read the clusters, as a trained individual could decode a piano roll, humans do 
not normally nor easily read binary code. Id. For additional discussion see H. BRUNNER, 
INTRODUCTION To MICROPROCESSORS, 1-12 (1982). 
29. Chandler, Proprietary Protection of Computer Software, II U. BALT. L. REV. 
195, 214 (1982). 
30. 17U.S.C. § 102 (1981). 
31. See supra note 10. A user perceives an application program through the com­
puter or machine in use. 
32. 17 U.S.C. § 117, as originally enacted by Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 
(1976). The original § 117 stated: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title 
does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights 
with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable 
of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction 
with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to works under 
the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on 
December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action 
brought under this title. 
Pub. L. 96-517,94 Stat. 3015, 3028 deleted the section in 1980. 
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state of the law as to the extent of copyright protection for the use of 
computer programs, without defining the law's status.33 Congress 
chose to wait and review the findings of CONTU before specifically 
extending full copyright protection to computer programs.34 During 
the period of vagueness, the United States district courts reached the 
conflicting opinions of Data Cash System, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc. 3s 
and Tandy Corporation v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc. 36 
In Data Cash, a district court in Illinois found that section 117 of 
the Copyright Act of 1976 prohibited applying the rest of the 1976 
Copyright Act to computer programs.37 The court held that under 
traditional common law a program stored on ROM was not a copy, 
since it could not be interpreted by a human being, and thus the Copy­
right Act did not protect it.38 A California district court, however, 
reached the opposite conclusion on substantially the same facts in 
Tandy Corp. 39 
In Tandy Corp. the court found that section 117 did not deny all 
copyright protection to programs but did limit the rights of a copy­
right holder for copyrighted material used in a computer.40 The court 
determined that a program was a work of authorship under sections 
101 and 102 of the Act.41 The court further found that a ROM is a 
33. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 779 
(C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). 
34. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 1. Congress specifically created CONTU 
to investigate the desirability of extending copyright protection to computer programs. 
35. Data Cash System, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 
1979). 
36. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Microcomputers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Ca., 
1981). 
37. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1066-68. Data Cash had marketed Compuchess, a 
hand-held computer capable of playing chess at six different levels of difficulty. The in­
structions for playing were encoded on a ROM chip in each machine. A ROM, or Read 
Only Memory, is an integrated circuit, or silicon chip, from which a computer can read a 
program but which cannot be altered in any way. Franklin, 545 F. Supp. at 813. JS&A 
Group began marketing a similar game containing a ROM with the identical program. 
Data Cash had copyrighted the "programmer language" version of the program and had 
marked all such copies with notice. The machine language version of the code was not 
copyrighted, however, and Data Cash did not include notice of copyright on the ROM, the 
Compuchess game itself, or its packaging. Id. at 1065-66. 
38. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1068-69. 
39. See Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. 171. 
40. Id. at 174. the court in Tandy Corp. observed that § 117 did not apply to §§ 101 
and 102, which identify the scope of copyrightable material, but applied only to §§ 106 
through 116 and 118, which identify the scope of copyright protection. Id. See supra note 
32. 
41. Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. at 173. Section 102 states: 
Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
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"tangible medium of expression" within the meaning of the Act such 
that the Act protects a computer program embedded on a ROM.42 
The court reasoned that since programs were copyrightable under sec­
tions 101 and 102, Congress must have intended to grant the ROMs 
some measure of protection.43 The court read section 117 as providing 
limited protection to the use of an authorized copy of the program in a 
computer, but fully protecting against the unauthorized copying of a 
properly copyrighted work.44 
C. 1980 Amendment to the Copyright Act 
Congress settled the disagreement over the copyrightability of 
computer programs in 1980 when it amended the 1976 Copyright 
Act.45 CONTU in its final report had recommended that the copy­
right law be amended to include computer programs explicitly.46 
CONTU had further recommended the deletion of section 117, so that 
protection would extend "to all computer uses of copyrighted pro­
grams."47 In 1980 Congress wrote CONTU's recommendations into 
law virtually verbatim.48 As a result, although no longer did any issue 
exist as to whether computer programs enjoyed copyright protec­
tion,49 the issue did arise as to the extent of the protection. 
The courts addressed the question of the scope of protection in 
Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artie International,50 in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit specifically found that the 1976 Copy­
right Act fully protected programs written in machine language or ob­
ject code.51 In Williams, the court inferred a clear Congressional 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following catego­
ries: (I) literary works; . . . 
17 U.S.c. § 102 (1981). Section 101 defines literary works to be "works ... expressed in 
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of 
the material objects ... in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). 
42. Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. at 173. Section 101 states that "a work [is] fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy. . . is sufficiently perma­
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). See supra note 41. 
43. Tandy Corp., 524 F. Supp. at 174. 
44. Id. at 174-75. 
45. Pub. L. No. 95-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980). 
46. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 54. 
47. Id. 
48. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782 
(C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). 
49. See Stem Electronics v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
50. Williams Electronics v. Arctic International, 685 F.2d 870 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
51. Id. at 876-77; See also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
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intent to grant copyright protection to programs in object code from 
the broad language that Congress used in defining "copy" and "fixa­
tion."52 The court specifically found that the definition of a copy in­
cluded a ROM since it was a "material object in which a work is fixed 
by any method ... andfrom which the work can be perceived, repro­
duced ... either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."53 
While most programs subject to litigation in this time were application 
programs,54 some were operating programs. 55 In Williams and previ­
ous cases, however, the parties never raised the question of whether 
the nature of the program should affect copyrightability. In 1982, 
however, Franklin Computer raised the issue as its primary defense in 
a copyright infringement suit initiated by Apple Computer which was 
seeking to protect 14 computer programs that it had developed for use 
in its Apple II computer.56 
IV. THE DECISION 
Apple Computer, Inc., was founded in 1976 and quickly became 
an acknowledged leader in the field of personal computers, having sold 
almost 400,000 computers by mid-1982.57 Franklin Computer, Inc., a 
small computer firm, started in 1981 and sold approximately 1000 
computers by mid-1982.58 Franklin Computers designed and manu­
factured the ACE 100 personal computer and marketed it as being 
capable of using the software packages and peripheral components 
designed for use with the Apple 11.59 In order to achieve compatibil­
ity, Franklin copied 14 of Apple's operating system programs.60 Ap­
52. Id. See also supra notes 41-42 and 52 and accompanying text. 
53. Id. The court quoted the definition of copy from 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis 
supplied by the court). 
54. In Williams, Stern, and Data Cash the programs all concerned games that inter­
acted with the user. See respectively: Williams, 685 F.2d at 872; Stern, 669 F.2d at 853; 
and Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1066. 
55. In Tandy Corp., the program at issue was an "input-output routine" that trans­
lated programmer language into computer or machine language. Tandy Corp., 524 F. 
Supp. at 173. Since any user of the machine remains unaware of the existence of the pro­
gram, it is tenned an operating program. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
56. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1245. 
57. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. 812, 812 (E.D. Pa., 
1982), rev'd 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
58. Id. 
59. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1242-43. 
60. Id. at 1244. The 14 copied programs represented a cost of 46 man-months or 
$740,000 to Apple Computer and included: Autostart ROM, which readies the various 
internal components of the computer when it is turned on; three versions of "Beginners All 
Purpose Instruction Code" (BASIC), which is used to translate instructions given by the 
user into low level primary code that the computer understands; and ten programs relating 
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pIe sued Franklin, alleging copyright infringement and seeking a 
preliminary injunction to restrain Franklin from using, copying, or 
selling any of the 14 programs.61 Franklin never denied that it had 
copied the Apple programs,62 but based its defense on the non­
copyrightability of operating programs63 and an assertion that Frank­
lin feasibly could not write its own programs. 64 
The district court focused on the first of Franklin's defenses and 
denied injunctive relief to Apple by concluding "that there is some 
doubt as to the copyrightability of the programs described in this liti­
gation."6s The court expressed doubts as to whether a program in 
object code embodied on a ROM could be copyrighted.66 Although 
the third circuit in Williams Electronics clearly answered the question 
in the affirmative,67 it announced its decision three days after the dis­
trict court had decided Franklin. 68 The district court also concluded 
that operating programs "eventually become an essential part of the 
machinery that produces the results"69 and as a part of a machine are 
more appropriately the subject of patent law and not copyright law.'o 
While the appeal of the district court's decision was pending, a 
district court in the ninth circuit granted a preliminary injunction to 
Apple Computer against Formula International, a wholesaler of per­
sonal computers, for copyright infringement of 5 of the 14 computer 
programs that were denied copyright protection in Franklin.71 The 
court in Formula disagreed with the reasoning in Franklin and held 
that the 1980 Amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act72 protected op­
erating programs. Relying on the recommendations of CONTU, the 
to obtaining, storing, or manipulating application programs or information stored on a 
"floppy disk," a method for expanding the useful memory of a computer. Id. at 1244-45 & 
note 4. 
61. Id. at 1244-45. 
62. Id. at 1245. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See id. at 1246 (quoting district court opinion, 545 F. SUpp. at 812). 
66. Id. at 1246. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55. 
68. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1249. 
69. Franklin, 545 F. SUpp. at 824 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 88 
(Commissioner Hershey dissenting) (emphasis deleted». 
70. Id. at 823-24. 
71. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 778 
(C.D. Cal. 1983), a./J'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). Formula International was selling a 
personal computer under the trademark Pineapple. The Pineapple kits were manufactured 
by independent companies in Taiwan and Hong Kong and were distributed by Formula, 
both at resale and wholesale. Id. at 777. 
72. Id. at 779. 
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district court opined "that all computer programs.. [should] be 
included within copyright protection."73 Observing that Congress had 
enacted the recommendations of CONTU into law almost verbatim, 
the court inferred that Congress did not intend to distinguish "be­
tween programs which are used in the production of further copy­
righted works" and those which embody "a system for the operation 
of a machine."74 
Prior to the third circuit's decision on the appeal of Franklin, the 
computer industry faced conflicting legal theories supporting conflict­
ing decisions as to the copyrightability of operating programs. In re­
versing the district court in Franklin, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals resolved the conflict by holding that the 1980 amendment to 
the 1976 Copyright Act extended copyright protection to all pro­
grams.75 The appellate court raised three legal issues that would de­
termine the copyrightability of Apple's operating computer programs: 
1) Does expressing a program in object code affect copyrightability; 
2) maya program embodied in a ROM be copyrighted; and 3) mayan 
operating program be copyrighted.76 Although the same court had 
previously dealt with the first two issues in Williams Electronics, it 
dealt separately with each issue in order to clarify its Williams 
opinion.77 
A. 	 Copyrightability ofa Computer Program Expressed in Object 
Code and Embodied in ROM 
The court followed its earlier decision in Williams Electronics, 
holding that the 1980 amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act pro­
tected programs expressed in object code.78 The court acknowledged 
that Chapter 17 U.S.C. section 102(a) did not specifically enumerate 
programs within the list of works of authorship.79 It found in the 1980 
73. Id. at 781 (emphasis supplied by the court). The court continued: 
The copyright status of the written rules for a game or a system for the operation 
ofa machine is unaffected by the fact that those rules direct the actions of those 
who play the game or carry out the process. Nor has copyright been denied to 
works simply because of their utilitarian aspects. It follows, therefore, that there 
should be likewise no distinction made between programs which are used in the 
production offurther copyrighted works and those which are not. 
Id. at 781-82 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 21) (emphasis supplied by the 
court). 
74. Id. at 782. 
75. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253-54. 
76. Id. at 1246. 
77. Id. at 1249-50.. 
78. Id. at 1248. 
79. Id. at 1247. 
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Amendment to the CopYright Act,80 however, a Congressional en­
dorsement of the suggestion of CONTU to extend copyright protec­
81tion to programs. The court examined the primary requirements to 
make a work copyrightable identified in the copyright statute; that is, 
the work "must be an 'original wor[k] of authorship,' and [it] must be 
'fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression.' "82 Section 102 next de­
fines works of authorship to include literary works.83 The section de­
fines literary works as "works. . . expressed in words, numbers. . . 
or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature. . . in which 
they are embodied."84 The court concluded that the expression of a 
program in object code does not negate its copyright classification as a 
work of authorship.8s Section 101 further defines a copy to be a "ma­
terial object, . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the 
work can be perceived, reproduced. . . either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device."86 The court of appeals rejected the opinion of 
the district court that copyright protection should be "limited to 
works designed to be 'read' by a human reader"87 by observing that 
the statute allows communication "either directly or with the aid ofa 
machine or device."88 The court concluded that copyright protection 
did extend, therefore, to programs expressed in object code. 
B. Copyrightability of Computer Operating System Programs 
The court found Franklin's argument that "computer operating 
system programs, as distinguished from application programs, are not 
the proper subject of copyright 'regardless of the language or medium 
in which they are fixed' " to be a novel issue not previously raised with 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.89 Section 102(b) of the 1976 
Copyright Act provides that in "no case does copyright protection 
. extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera­
80. Pub.L. No. 95-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980). Congress enacted into law the 
recommendations of CONTU essentially verbatim. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula 
International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 
1984). See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 1. 
81. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1247. 
82. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(I) (1981». 
83. 17 U.S.C. § 102a(l) (1981). 
84. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). 
85. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1249. The clusters of ones and zeros that represent binary 
or object code would qualify as "numerical symbols or indicia." See Note, Copyright Pro­
tection o/Computer Program Object Code 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1726-27 (1983). 
86. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). 
87. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1248 (quoting district court opinion, 545 F. Supp. at 821). 
88. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1981) (emphasis supplied by the court). 
89. Id. at 1249-50 (quoting Brief of Appellee at 15). 
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tion . . regardless of the form in which it is described. . or embod­
ied. . . . "90 Franklin maintained that "an operating system program 
is either a 'process', a 'system' or 'method of operation' and thus un­
copyrightable under § 102."91 In addition, Franklin suggested that 
section 1 02(b) represented a codification of the rule set down in Baker 
v. Seldon 92 that copyright laws may not be used to obtain and hold a 
monopoly over an idea.93 Franklin repeated the opinion expressed by 
the dissenting members of CONTU that "the instructions themselves 
eventually become an essential part of the machinery that produces the 
results. They may become ... a permanent part of the actual ma­
chinery...."94 In response to Franklin's assertions, the court stated 
that copyright law protects only the specific instructions actually ex­
pressed in a program and does not protect the general process or 
method of operation that might result from them.9s The court de­
clared that the confusion expressed by the district court resulted from 
mistakenly focusing on the "physical characteristics of the instruc­
tions" and not on the instructions themselves.96 
The court next addressed the issue of the copyrightability of a 
computer operating program as a purely utilitarian work. Franklin 
relied on dictum in Baker v. Seldon stating that "where the art it 
teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams 
used . . . such methods and diagrams are to be considered as neces­
sary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public ...."97 
Although a literal construction of the court's language would apply to 
all operating programs, the court of appeals found a previous Supreme 
Court case, Mazer v. Stein,98 controlling.99 In Mazer, the Court stated 
"we find nothing in the copyright statute. . . that the intended use or 
use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its 
registration."I°O The court of appeals in Franklin also relied on 
90. 17 U.S.c. § 102(b) (1981). 
91. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1250. 
92. 101 U.S. 99 (1974). Baker involved a copyright infringement suit over an ac­
countant book that used pages ruled and arranged in a manner first described and displayed 
in a book explaining a particular bookkeeping system. The court in Baker held that "the 
copyright of a book does not give the [author] the exclusive right to use the system ex­
plained in the books." Id. at 100. 
93. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1251-52. 
94. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 28 (emphasis in the report). 
95. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1250-51. 
96. Id. at 1251. 
97. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103. 
98. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
99. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252. 
100. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218. 
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CONTU's rejection of the Baker doctrine as implying congressional 
intent that the ultimate use of a program would not affect its 
copyrightability.101 The Franklin court concluded, therefore, that 
limiting the use of a program to make a machine functional does not 
negate the protection extended to the program as a literary work of 
art. 102 
In concluding that Congress did not intend to distinguish be­
tween operating and application programs when granting copyright 
protection, the court of appeals emphasized the statutory definition of 
"computer program" added to section 101 of the Act by the 1980 
Amendment. 103 Congress defined a computer program as "a set of 
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com­
puter in order to bring about a certain result." 104 The court specifically 
agreed with the interpretation of the court in Formula International105 
when it stated "there is nothing in any of the statutory terms which 
suggest a different result for different types of computer programs 
based upon the function they serve in the machine."I06 
C. 	 The Effect on Copyright Protection When the Computer Program 
Merges with the Idea 
Finally, the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the 
expression of an idea in an operating program could become so 
merged with the idea it, represented as to preclude copyright protec­
tion under section 102.107 Traditionally, patent law protects an idea 
for seventeen years if the idea has been successfully reduced to prac­
tice.108 Copyright, on the other hand, protects only the expression of 
an idea. 109 The court held that if the creation of other computer pro­
grams that performed the same function as Apple's operating system 
programs were possible, then the program represented only an expres­
sion of the idea and hence were copyrightable. 110 Since the district 
101. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252. See note 79 and accompanying text. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1981) (emphasis added). 
105. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. 
Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). See also notes 70-73 and accompanying 
text. , 
106. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting Formula International, 562 F. Supp. at 
780). 
107. Id. at 1252. Section 102 prohibits the extension of copyright protection to any 
idea. See note 90 and accompanying text. 
108. 	 See CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 16. 
109. 	 Id. 
110. 	 Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253. 
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court had made no finding of fact as to whether Apple's operating 
programs represented the only means of expressing their underlying 
ideas, the circuit court remanded the issue to the district court. III 
V. ANALYSIS 
The traditional purpose of copyright law is to encourage disclo­
sure of intellectual or aesthetic ideas to the public, promoting public 
availability of the ideas by protecting the creator's perceived rights in 
them. 112 In modem times, a secondary purpose of protecting intellec­
tual property capable of extensive reproduction has developed. ll3 
With the recent popularity of personal computers, the need to protect 
computer programs has arisen out of both concerns. The development 
of programs requires creativity, time, and money, thus necessitating 
the protection of creators' investments so that they may reap the bene­
fits of their initiative. Similarly, since programs constitute an integral 
part of video games, personal computers, and work processors that all 
enjoy increased popularity, the desire as well as ability to reproduce 
programs has become extensive. 
Congress recognized the need for protection during its revision of 
the Copyright Act in 1976 and appointed CONTU to study the prob­
lem and to make commendations,l14 As a result of its study, CONTU 
recommended extending copyright protection to computer pro­
grams. IIS CONTU's intent to include all computer programs in the 
expanded protection can be inferred from the dissenting opinion of 
Commissioner Hersey 116 and the concurring opinion of Commissioner 
Nimmer.ll7 Both opinions questioned CONTU's wisdom in recom­
mending "open-ended copyright protection for all computer 
software."1l8 In 1980, Congress wrote into law virtually verbatim 
CONTU's recommendationsl19 including the deletion of the original 
section 117 and the addition of the definition of computer program in 
111. Id. Conflicting evidence surfaced during the trial, with Franklin presenting wit­
nesses testifying to the impossibility of rewriting the Apple programs and Apple claiming 
that third parties had already produced comparable programs. Id. at 1245. 
112. Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code 96 HARV. L. 
REv. 1723, 1739 (1983). 
113. Id. 
114. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
115. Id. at 54. 
116. Id. at 86. 
117. Id. at 84. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
118. Id. at 85. See id. at 86-90. 
119. See supra notes71-79 and accompanying text. 
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section 101.120 The Congressional action created a strong inference 
that the 1980 amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act encompassed the 
intent of CONTU's Report. 121 The court of appeals in Franklin rec­
ognized the inferencel22 and honored it. 123 The third circuit thus 
agreed with the only other reported case that had addressed the 
issue. 124 
Commissioners Hersey and Nimmer of CONTU both expressed 
doubts about the Commission's failure to articulate any rationale that 
distinguished computer programs from any other "tangible expression 
of any and all original ideas."12s In particular, Nimmer articulated his 
concern that such a broad construction of literary works could result 
in transforming the Copyright Act into a general misappropriation 
law, equally applicable to areas traditionally left unprotected as well as 
to areas of traditional patent protection. 126 Judge Newcomber, in his 
opinion in Franklin, echoed Commissioner Nimmer's concern and 
worried that such a wide application of copyright protection would 
circumvent the antimonopoly limitations established by patent law. 127 
While the Commissioners' concerns may yet prove to be justified, Con­
gress has chosen for the present not to institute an arbitrary limit to 
the copyrightability of a computer program based solely upon its char­
acterization as either an application or operating program. 
The court of appeals in Franklin did, however, recognize at least 
one limitation to the copyrightability of programs under existing law. 
The court found that section 102 of the Act prohibited copyright pro­
tection if the program, or expression of the idea, so merged to the idea 
that they became inseparable. 128 If other programs could be created 
that would duplicate the functions of the existing program, however, 
then the original program would be only an expression of the idea 
120. Pub. L. No. 95-517. 94 Stat. 3015.3028 (1980). The original § 117 limited the 
copyright protection available to computer programs. See supra notes 32-44 and accompa­
nying text. 
121. Formula International. 562 F. Supp. at 781. 
122. Franklin. 714 F.2d at 1247. 
123. Id. at 1253-54. 
124. Id. at 1252 (citing Apple Computer. Inc. v. Formula International. Inc.• 562 F. 
Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983). affd. 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984». 
125. CONTU REPORT. supra note 2 at 84-85. 
126. Id. at 85 (emphasis in the report). 
127. Franklin. 545 F. Supp. at 824. "A submission for patent protection must be 
novel. useful and non-obvious." Chandler. Proprietary Protection o/Computer Software. U. 
DALT. L. REV. 195.231 (1982). In addition copyright protection lasts for the life of the 
author plus at least 50 years. while patent protection is limited to 17 years. CONTU RE­
PORT. supra note 2 at 72. 
128. Franklin. 714 F.2d at 1252; see supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. 
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behind the program and capable of copyright protection. 129 Although 
the court's limitation appears to be a straightforward mechanical test, 
a court retains a degree of flexibility in applying the limitation, since 
its applicability will hinge on how broadly or narrowly the court de­
fines the primary function of the program. The narrower or more 
specific the functions defined as primary to the program, the more dif­
ficult it will be to demonstrate the possibility of alternate programs. 
The court of appeals in Franklin found that compatibility with 
Apple II software and hardware was not a primary function of the 
programs but rather "a commercial and competitive objective" of 
Franklin and, therefore, not pertinent to the question of whether the 
programs had merged with the ideas. 13o The court did not clearly ar­
ticulate the test it had applied nor did it indicate what facts would be 
necessary to find that compatibility with existing software and hard­
ware had been a primary function of a program. Such a finding would 
increase the probability that a court would then find a merger between 
the program and the idea, thereby barring copyrightability. Thus, 
while the court of appeals in Franklin extended copyright protection 
to include operating programs, it also recognized a statutory limitation 
to the copyrightability of programs that courts in the future may use 
to deny the full protection of copyright law in a case in which such 
extensive protection would prove to be detrimental to the public good. 
In his concurring opinion in the CONTU report, Commissioner 
Nimmer observed that Congress possesses the ability to modify the 
extent of copyright protection offered programs if the present law 
proves unduly restrictive. \31 Nimmer recommended that a logical line 
of demarcation is to limit copyright protection to only those programs 
that produce works that themselves qualify for copyright protec­
tion.132 Thus, programs designed to operate in conjunction with a 
data retrieval system or video game would be copyrightable but a pro­
gram that turns lights on and off in an office building or regulates the 
mixture of air and fuel in an engine would not. Commissioner Nim­
mer's limitation is particularly appropriate in light of the recent Dia­
mond v. Diehr133 decision in which the Supreme Court rejected the 
patent examiner's conclusion that because a process used a computer 
program to achieve its result it fell outside patent law.134 Since a to­
129. Id. at 1252-53. 
130. Id. 
131. CONTU REPORT, supra note 2 at 26. 
132. Id. 
133. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
134. Id. at 175; see The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). 
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tally utilitarian program may now be protected as it is actually used in 
a patentable machine or process, the value of copyright protection, 
which is limited only to the expression and not the idea embodied in 
the program,13S apparently is diminished. If full copyright protection 
for all programs proves to be too cumbersome, Congress may well de­
cide that patent law adequately protects utilitarian programs and, 
therefore, deny additional protection under copyright law. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
With the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Frank­
lin, federal courts apparently are following a uniform interpretation of 
the 1976 Copyright Act, as amended in 1980, and are extending copy­
right protection to all computer programs. The judicial interpretation 
is based upon the clear recommendations made by CONTU. Copy­
right protection extends only to the expression of instructions of the 
computer program itself and not to the ideas, systems, or processes it 
represents. If a particular computer program constitutes the only pos­
sible method for expressing its underlying idea, then the theory states 
that the expression merges with the idea and copyright protection is 
not available. If Congress eventually decides that the broad inclusion 
of all computer programs under the Copyright Act is unduly restric­
tive, it may decide to limit protection to computer programs that pro­
duce works that themselves qualify for copyright protection. 
Richard G. Weber 
135. Patent law protects the idea as actually used in the invention, independent of its 
fonn. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
